Nigeria spent more than ₦1 trillion importing iron and steel in 2025. At the same time, one of the country’s biggest industrial projects has spent more than four decades waiting to become the steel giant it was designed to be.

The National Bureau of Statistics data, cited in a report on Monday, shows that Nigeria’s iron and steel import bill rose above ₦1 trillion last year, compared with an average of about ₦526 billion annually over the preceding six years. The figures cover officially recorded imports and may not capture underreported or smuggled products.

That is the strange part of Nigeria’s steel story. The country has iron ore deposits, a huge construction and manufacturing market and a massive steel complex in Ajaokuta, Kogi State. Yet manufacturers still depend heavily on imported steel.

The Ajaokuta project was conceived in the 1970s as the foundation of an integrated steel industry, linking iron ore mining to steel production and the manufacturing industries that would use it. More than 40 years later, that chain remains unfinished.

Ajaokuta became a project without production

Ajaokuta was designed to produce steel at an initial capacity of about 1.3 million tonnes annually, with plans to eventually expand to 5.2 million tonnes. It was never simply intended to be another factory. It was supposed to supply the raw material for construction, manufacturing, engineering, transport and other industries.

But the plant never reached integrated commercial production.

The project became trapped in a cycle of incomplete construction, changing governments, failed concessions and legal disputes. One of the most controversial attempts to revive it ended in an international dispute that Nigeria eventually settled for US$496 million in 2022.

The cost has not been limited to old contracts. The 2026 budget allocated ₦6.69 billion to Ajaokuta Steel Company, including ₦6.04 billion for personnel. That means about 90.4 percent of the company’s allocation is going to personnel costs, while only ₦410.8 million is earmarked for capital expenditure.

It is difficult to find a clearer illustration of the problem: Nigeria is still spending money maintaining the institution around a steel plant that is not producing steel at the scale for which it was built.

The revival plan is finally moving beyond promises

There are signs that the government is trying a different approach.

In July, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company and its partners signed a gas sale and aggregation agreement with Ajaokuta Steel Company. The arrangement is intended to support the energy needs of the steel complex and forms part of a wider effort to provide the infrastructure needed for industrial production.

The government is also in advanced discussions with a Chinese company over a proposed revival of Ajaokuta, with the Minister of Steel Development saying in July that an agreement was expected before the end of 2026.

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That is significant, but it is not yet production. Another agreement will only matter if it results in a functioning plant, commercially viable operations and a supply chain capable of moving Nigerian iron ore into Nigerian steel and then into Nigerian manufacturing.

The government is targeting 10 million tonnes of liquid steel production annually by 2030 and says the sector could create more than 500,000 direct and indirect jobs.

The question is whether Ajaokuta can become a meaningful part of that target.

Nigeria is building steel without waiting for Ajaokuta

The most interesting development is that the Nigerian steel industry is no longer entirely dependent on the old giant.

Private investors are already putting money into new projects. Stellar Steel has a US$400 million project in Ogun State, while African Industries Group is developing an integrated iron and steel project in Kaduna that includes direct reduced iron production. The Federal Government has also signed a US$1 billion investment agreement with India’s Rashmi Metaliks Group.

Another legacy plant is also being brought back. In August, the government signed an agreement aimed at reviving Delta Steel Company, now Premium Steel and Mines, with more than US$1.3 billion in expected investment.

This changes the Ajaokuta question.

Nigeria no longer has to choose between importing steel and waiting for one government-owned plant to succeed. The private sector is already building capacity, while the government tries to revive its largest legacy asset.

Ajaokuta still matters because of its scale, infrastructure and place in Nigeria’s industrial history. But after decades of unfinished promises, its value will ultimately be measured by what it produces, not how much has been spent on it.

Nigeria’s ₦1 trillion steel import bill is therefore more than a trade statistic. It is the cost of leaving an industrial ambition unfinished. The next attempt to revive Ajaokuta will have to prove that the country can finally turn that ambition into steel.

Cynthia Nwanonyiri